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Powerful perpetrators, hidden in plain sight: an international analysis of organisational child sexual abuse cases

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ABSTRACT

There is virtually no literature on child sexual abuse committed by “powerful perpetrators”, who, use position, reputation, wealth and/or power, to become influential members of their organisation. Seventeen cases relating to youth serving organisations were identified using a comprehensive search of databases covering case reviews from England, Australia and the US. A Quantitative Content Analysis was used to analyse the sample with a focus on identifying offenders’ “modus operandi”. Findings revealed a number of critical differences between powerful perpetrators and other child sexual offenders described in the literature. Findings are discussed in relation to their implications for creating safer youth serving organisations. In particular, focusing on educating YSOs to recognise and address risks posed by powerful perpetrators; expanding organisational safety policies and practices and taking steps to develop a strong, positive organisational safety culture are commended as key approaches.

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Introduction

Estimates suggest that hundreds of millions of children and adolescents around the world regularly receive a variety of services from community-based, youth serving organisations (YSOs). These organisations are broadly defined as providing a specific service or services to children and adolescents and address a broad range of children’s needs related to education, leisure, health and mental health, out-of-home residential and foster care, as well as social and development enhancement (Commission for Children and Young People, 2019). The breadth of services rendered by YSOs to children is considerable. For example, approximately 50 million children in the United States (US) attend school each year (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016), while 8.6 million children (78%) are regularly enrolled in United Kingdom (UK) schools (Department for Education, 2016). In Australia, estimates suggest that 70% of children aged between 5 and 15 years participate in youth sports (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009), while in the US as many as 61% of children (45 million) are regularly involved in youth sports (Noble & Vermillion, 2014). Moreover, millions of US children attend leisure-based YSOs (e.g. Boys and Girls Clubs of America [4 million; BGCA, 2016], Boy Scouts of America [1 million; Reuters, 2015]).

Children stand to gain a great deal from their involvement in YSOs. Potential benefits of organisational involvement extend beyond instrumental needs (e.g. health, housing, supervision), are well documented, and include improved physical, social, and emotional health (Sabo & Veliz, 2008; Vella, Cliff, Magee, & Okely, 2014). At the same time, however, there is continuing evidence in the YSO context of the risk for harm to children, including child sexual abuse as well as physical

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abuse, emotional abuse, and accident related injury (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2011; Brackenridge, Bishopp, Moussalli, & Tapp, 2008; John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 2004; Mountjoy, Rhind, Tiivas, & Leglise, 2015; Shakeshaft, 2004). At present, there is no systematic mechanism for tracking child sexual abuse in YSOs although a number of studies offer insights into the scope of the problem. Estimates vary widely, but a generally accepted study suggests that 9.6% of school children (or 5 million) in 8th–12th grades (12–16 year olds) are victims of child sexual abuse perpetrated by educators and school personnel (Shakeshaft, 2004). In a study of the US foster care system 10% of maltreatment reports involved child sexual abuse (Benedict, Zuravin, Brandt, & Abbey, 1994). Finally, a study of Australian athletes involved in competitive sports identified 12.9% of females and 6.3% of males as victims of sexual abuse in that context (Leahy, Pretty, & Tenenbaum, 2002).

The existing literature on child sexual abuse in organisational settings, while offering insights into abuse risk factors, is limited and has in particular failed to systematically investigate organisational abuse committed by what are described here as “powerful perpetrators”. Many organisations have an association with one or more highly influential individuals. This includes those in leadership positions (e.g. an organisation’s president; an agency director), board members, high status professionals who work within the organisation (e.g. physicians), and major donors or celebrities. They may also be accomplished or long-standing employees whose informal organisational status leads to them being considered beyond reproach. Their power may be derived from a combination of influence on the organisation based on a position of power (e.g. holding a leadership or other respected role such as coach or team physician), being accorded a level of reverence or adoration within the organisation, personal wealth, and/or influence with relevant stakeholders (e.g. other donors, policy makers). Doran and Brannan (1996) describe one archetype of such offenders as the “charismatic, articulate, well networked, ‘caring professional’ who is usually a part of the leadership of the institution” (p.158). Sullivan and Quayle (2012) detail this type of offenders’ efforts to manage their image with other staff as well as with the families that they serve. Of course, far from all individuals in particular professions or positions will attain such power, or for that matter exploit the power they have achieved. As such, becoming a powerful perpetrator is not simply defined by a particular type of job title, but rather by attaining power secondary to a position (or through celebrity or self-created/charismatic authority) and using that authority or influence to circumvent safeguarding rules, as noted in the criteria in Table 1 (see below).

Table 1. Powerful perpetrator case selection criteria.

Study inclusion criteria

- (1) Reliable source of case-based data – One independent case review, comprehensive organisational review, rigorous case study, or detailed court judgement. However, for press coverage multiple sources are required. We will require at least two sources reporting the same information to meet this criterion. The exception here will be that we may use a single press report describing an individual’s experiences (e.g. a survivor’s report of experiencing a particular modus operandi behaviour)
- (2) Sufficient detail to adequately describe the behaviour – To be included, enough detail will need to be provided to clearly describe the modus operandi behaviour in question
- (3) Ability to Circumvent Safeguarding Rules – To be defined as a powerful perpetrator the individual must have the ability to ignore, or claim exception to, or exemption from, safeguarding rules. Specifically, this requires: evidence of one or more types of authority (see 4 below) to ignore or evade usual rules or an expectation or lack of consistent adherence to organisational rules or guidelines without significant consequence
- (4) Utilises Key Types of Authority – Inasmuch as sexual abuse is an abuse of power, all perpetrators are to some extent powerful. In order to establish that the perpetrators in this study could be considered of sufficient power in the organisational context to circumvent existing safety policies and practices, their authority need to reflect one or more of the following:
 - Ascribed, hierarchical or positional authority – in this case, “power” is organisationally bestowed on the individual as a function of their position;
 - Self-created or charismatic authority (which includes organisational celebrity) – This reflects an individual who creates a position of power within the youth serving organisation that was not organisationally provided;
 - Local or national celebrity – Represents status which originates external to the youth serving organisation.
- (5) Offences include or are solely child sexual abuse – i.e. illegal sexual behaviour between an adult and a child who is under the age of majority and/or otherwise unable to provide consent to sexual activity with the offender.

The significance of addressing child sexual abuse perpetrated by powerful offenders is underscored both by the fact that all YSOs have such individuals in their organisation and that these are people who often have the latitude to be “above the law” with regard to complying with standard organisational safety policies and practices. The number of people who might be considered sufficiently powerful to circumvent existing organisational rules by virtue of their position within YSOs is significant. For example, there are 251,300 US elementary, middle, and high school principals (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019), 28,990 US paediatricians (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018) and 415,656 Catholic clerics worldwide (US News and World Report, 2018), a significant proportion of whom may be of sufficient seniority or status to be able to circumvent rules and safeguards. According to Beth Guy (Senior Education Officer, Commission for Children and Young People, Victoria, Australia; Personal Communication, 18 May 2017) the Australian state of Victoria estimates that there are over 50,000 YSOs in their state alone and each organisation would have a number of individuals who would be considered powerful by virtue of their position or status, as described above.

While these powerful individuals may be some of an organisation’s greatest assets, they may also present one of its most significant risks. Cases of child sexual abuse by powerful offenders have accounted for large numbers of victims and long-standing adverse impacts on the organisations in which the abuse occurred (e.g. UK Paediatric Oncologist Dr. Miles Bradbury [Scott-Moncrieff & Morris, 2015]; US Penn State University Assistant Football Coach Jerry Sandusky [Freeh, Sporkin, & Sullivan, 2012]; US Paediatrician Dr. Earl Bradley [Ammons, 2010]; UK celebrity Sir Jimmy Savile [Lampard & Marsden, 2015]; UK Teacher William Vahey [Wonnacott and Carmi 2016]).

It is clear, therefore, that there are millions of individuals worldwide who would be considered powerful members of YSOs. This study will draw on known instances where child sexual abuse offenders in YSO settings have “successfully” used their authority and status to circumvent safeguarding policies and practices in order to perpetrate child sexual abuse (Wurtele, 2012).

Developing a better understanding of abuse by powerful offenders in the US and Australia has previously been hampered both by the lack of a systematic reporting mechanism to identify such cases (Lanning & Dietz, 2012) and the rarity of in-depth investigations into those powerful child sexual abuse perpetrators who have been caught and prosecuted. However, this study was able to take advantage of case studies of organisational abuse prepared specifically for the Australian *Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse* (Royal Commission, 2016) which was active from 2013 to 2018 and a small number of independent in-depth reviews regarding high profile organisational abuse cases in the US.

By contrast, England and Wales have long required processes for the investigation of significant child abuse cases, a proportion of them child sexual abuse perpetrated by powerful organisational offenders. Local multi-agency safeguarding bodies (e.g. Local Safeguarding Children’s Boards) have been required to undertake a case review in a broad range of circumstances (Department for Education, 2015). The purpose of these reviews is to create a better understanding of how the abuse occurred and why it was not prevented or detected and effectively addressed at an earlier stage, as well as to identify what lessons can be learned. Such reviews offer one of the few opportunities to scrutinise practice, examine case details, and to use the benefit of hindsight to improve policy, procedure, and practice in a manner that can help prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. In addition, the level of concern about the ability of Sir Jimmy Savile to offend in a wide range of settings led to an unprecedented number of inquiries into his activity being ordered by the Secretary of State for Health (Erooga, 2018), reports from three of which were also drawn on for this study.

Despite the rich nature of these investigations, to date the research literature has neither integrated findings across inquiries and reviews nor examined their implications for the prevention of child sexual abuse to improve children’s safety within the YSO context, especially where powerful perpetrators are concerned. The often detailed and behaviourally specific nature of inquiries and case reports make them particularly valuable for enhancing understanding of both organisational

offenders' modus operandi and the contribution of organisational vulnerabilities to the perpetration of child sexual abuse. Findings of this nature have general implications for YSO safety as well as the prevention of child sexual abuse perpetration by powerful offenders in particular.

In this context, "modus operandi" can be defined as a perpetrator's behaviour intended to facilitate abusive acts and reduce the chances of detection in the time prior to, during, and following child sexual abuse (Kaufman et al., 1998; Kaufman & Patterson, 2010). The observable nature of modus operandi and its direct links to offending make it especially valuable in the development of child sexual abuse prevention strategies. Child sexual abuse offenders' modus operandi has been discussed in the research literature for nearly three decades (Colton, Roberts, & Vanstone, 2009; Conte & Berliner, 1988; Elliott, Browne, & Kilcoyne, 1995; Kaufman, Hilliker, & Daleiden, 1996; Kaufman et al., 1998; Leclerc, Proulx, & McKibben, 2005; Leclerc & Tremblay, 2007; Leclerc, Proulx, & Beauregard, 2009; Leclerc, Proulx, Lussier, & Allaire, 2009; Leclerc, Wortley, & Smallbone, 2010; Turner, Rettenberger, Lohmann, Eher, & Briken, 2014; Turner et al., 2016; Van Dam, 2001; Kaufman & Patterson, 2010). (For more details on sexual offenders' modus operandi, in general, see the review by Kaufman and Patterson [2010] and for specifics on modus operandi in youth serving organisations, we recommend Kaufman and Erooga's review for the Australian Royal Commission [2016] and Turner and Briken [2015]). At the same time, there is a relative paucity of literature specifically examining the perpetration of child sexual abuse in YSOs (Colton et al., 2009; Leclerc et al., 2005; Moulden, Firestone, Kingston, & Wexler, 2010; Parkinson, Oates, & Jayakody, 2012; Sullivan, Beech, Craig, & Gannon, 2010). Given the importance of offenders' modus operandi for effective prevention programming (Kaufman & Erooga, 2016; Kaufman & Patterson, 2010; Leclerc et al., 2005; Reppucci & Haugaard, 1989) as well as treatment planning (Turner et al., 2014), there is a clear need for additional research in this area, particularly with regard to powerful perpetrators.

This study contributes to the existing literature by expanding our understanding of key modus operandi factors associated with powerful perpetrators in the YSO context. This investigation employs a quantitative content analysis with an international sample of powerful perpetrators from carefully selected case reviews and inquiries regarding organisational child sexual abuse. Findings pertaining to powerful perpetrators are discussed in relation to other types of child sexual abuse offenders and recommendations are offered to develop safety policies, practices, and prevention strategies to address the risk posed by this, so far neglected, group of child sexual abuse offenders.

Contextualising research on child sexual abuse in youth serving organisations

It is important to consider "powerful perpetrators" within the context of national initiatives regarding child sexual abuse in YSOs. In contrast to the US where there has been no national initiative, England and Wales has an ongoing inquiry, the *Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse* (IICSA, 2018) and in Australia the *Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse* (Royal Commission, 2016) was active from 2013 to 2018. This proved to be the largest investigation into institutional child sexual abuse in history, employing 250 staff and costing in excess of 387 million Australian dollars (Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2016). During its tenure, the Royal Commission contracted 40 external research projects, released 11 Issues Papers on key topics, conducted 6,706 private sessions with individual survivors, completed 57 extended public hearings and case studies, and produced both an interim and a final 17 volume report (Wright, Swain, & McPhillips, 2017).

The Royal Commission's efforts represent a watershed moment in the history of research into the perpetration of child sexual abuse in YSOs. That is not to say that previous research is absent, but rather that it was limited in scope and reflected an under-researched area. Previous studies shed light on child sexual abuse in YSOs in general (Erooga, Allnock, & Telford, 2012; Leclerc et al., 2005; Sullivan & Beech, 2002; Sullivan & Beech, 2004), as well as relative to specific types of YSOs (e.g. Sports – Brackenridge, 2003; Schools – Burgess, Welner, & Willis, 2010; the Catholic Church –

Langevin, Curnoe, & Bain, 2000). The breadth and depth of the Royal Commission's work is, however, unparalleled.

Despite the existence of a prior literature, and the extensive nature of the Royal Commission's work, there is rarely any mention of child sexual abuse perpetrated in YSOs by powerful perpetrators in the research literature (Mathews, 2017a). This is a significant gap given that YSOs, without exception, include powerful organisation members with the potential to abuse their authority; the sheer number of powerful individuals that are associated with YSOs; and the fact that YSO safety efforts generally do not address the potential for this type of child sexual abuse.

This study was designed to identify the modus operandi of powerful perpetrators, a sub-group of child sexual abuse offenders, based on data gleaned from a carefully selected sample of international inquiries and case studies. In addition to describing powerful perpetrators' modus operandi, efforts will be undertaken to contrast their patterns of perpetration with those of other child sexual abuse offenders (i.e. organisational and community-based) as well as discussing implications for prevention and future research.

Methodology

The following section describes the process of selecting cases for this review. It also outlines procedures for systematically categorising and analysing modus operandi strategies used by this sample of powerful perpetrators. The study was submitted to one of the first authors' university Institutional Review Board (Ethics Committee) for review and was deemed not to require institutional review. This determination was primarily based on the fact that all case materials came from publicly available reports of inquiries and case reviews. Despite this, additional efforts were made to ensure that this article did not include specific details of cases pertaining to individual victims.

Selecting organisational perpetrator cases for inclusion

Case reviews and inquiries are terms used to describe in-depth investigations and their resulting reports related to child sexual abuse in YSOs, referred to here as "cases". Inquiry formats vary between countries but common to all is the expectation that published reports will be anonymised to prevent identification of child sexual abuse victims and include recommendations to improve future policy and practice. Inquires may be undertaken to examine a specific case or set of circumstances or they may be concerned with widespread systemic issues of institutional abuse (e.g. child sexual abuse across a series of out-of-home [or foster care] settings). For example, broad based, national inquiries have been conducted in the Republic of Ireland (*The Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse*, Government of Ireland, 2009), Australia (Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2017) and England (*The Independent Inquiry into Institutional Child Sexual Abuse*, IICSA, 2018). In England, the case of Jimmy Savile, a celebrity and significant public figure, led to an unprecedented 70 inquiries into his sexually abusive behaviour in a range of organisational contacts over five decades (Erooga, 2018). As noted above, case reviews and inquiries are not typically features of the US or Australian systems. Instead, these cases are usually reported in the media, sometimes leading to the commissioning of independent reviews, and at times court documents become available to provide some, often less detailed, case information.

This study uses information from an examination of 17 recent Australian, UK and US cases. These were chosen as they are from English speaking countries where a significant level of attention is now being applied to organisational abuse. These cases represent a partial sample of all relevant inquiries and case reviews reflecting child sexual abuse within organisational settings (which is itself a sub-sample of all incidents of child sexual abuse in organisational settings across the three countries).

In order to identify cases for possible inclusion a search strategy was designed, focusing on cases reviewed between 2010 and 2018 to maximise their current relevance. Each of the authors conducted separate searches of available sources to identify potential cases of Powerful Perpetrators for

inclusion. In some instances the authors were already aware of cases potentially relevant to this study. To identify other possibly relevant cases a literature review was undertaken using Google and Bing with the terms: sexual abuse; child sexual abuse; case review; professional; organisation; inquiry; paedophile; pedophile; powerful; powerful perpetrator; sex offender; abuse of trust; Youth Serving Organisations; Serious Case Review. Additionally, search engine databases consulted included PsychINFO, MEDLINE, Criminal Justice Abstracts, and the UK NSPCC Library Search Service.

A database which collates child abuse case reviews for England, the “National Case Review Repository” was also utilised to identify cases between 2010 and 2018 which related to organisational abuse. An internet search was conducted to identify potentially relevant US sexual abuse cases or case reviews. In relation to Australian perpetrators, the authors reviewed case studies which formed part of the Australian Royal Commission into institutional abuse inquiry process.

In total, this methodology yielded an initial pool of 24 cases which were reviewed in further detail, as described below. Where no case review or other official report was available, the criteria listed below were used to ensure that the information available (e.g. media coverage) was sufficiently reliable to be included in the sample. For each of the 24 cases identified through this process, source materials were accessed and then reviewed relative to the established Powerful Perpetrator criteria (See [Table 1](#)). This process resulted in a final sample of 17 cases.

Inclusion criteria

To be selected for inclusion in this study cases were required to meet the criteria outlined in [Table 1](#). Briefly, these criteria involve: (1) ensuring that there is reliable case-based information; (2) confirming that there is adequate detail to describe offenders’ modus operandi; (3) determining that the offender was able to circumvent safeguarding rules; (4) ensuring that he (all cases involved male offenders) demonstrated a sufficient level of power within the organisation whose youth he abused; and (5) confirming that the offense(s) included child sexual abuse.

Available materials for each case were initially reviewed by one of the three authors to determine if they met study criteria (see [Table 1](#)). This information was recorded on an inclusion criteria coding sheet.

A second review of each case’s materials and the completed inclusion criteria coding sheet was then conducted by a second of the study’s authors to confirm the disposition for each case. Any discrepancy between different authors regarding inclusion criteria (i.e. inter-coder discrepancies) was discussed by all the authors until a final determination could be made. Of the initial 24 cases reviewed, 17 were identified as fully meeting the study inclusion criteria for powerful perpetrators and seven were excluded. The 17 cases reflected child sexual abuse committed in YSO contexts by fifteen different perpetrators. Whilst the majority of cases pertained to a unique perpetrator, three of the inquiries (Cases # 9, 15,16) relate to offending by Sir Jimmy Savile in different UK organisational contexts.

Characteristics of the sample

Of the 17 cases used, seven were UK formal case reviews (Cases #1, 2, 4, 9, 14, 15, 16); four were in-depth US case reviews (Cases #5, 8,12,13); one was a UK official Serious Case Review (Case #17); three were Australian Royal Commission case studies (Cases #6, 7,10); one was based on US press coverage (Cases #11) and one was based on a combination of UK press coverage and judicial sentencing remarks (Case #3). Six cases were related to medical settings (Cases #4, 8,10,12,15,16); four to sport, including dance (Cases #3,7,11,17); three to faith-based settings (Cases #1, 2, 6); and two each to education settings (Cases #5,17) and the entertainment industry (Cases #9,14). Overall, eight of the inquiries/reviews described UK cases, five were US cases, and the remaining four were from the Australian Royal Commission’s case studies. A brief description of each case and the factors that determined its inclusion in this study is presented in [Table 2](#).

Table 2. Description of case sampled and source of data.

Data source	Brief outline of issues in the case
<p>Case #1 <i>Peter Ball</i> Gibb, M. (2017) <i>An Abuse of Faith: The Independent Peter Ball Review</i>, London, Church of England (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Peter Ball was a Bishop in the Church of England, serving as Bishop of Lewes and Bishop of Gloucester.2. Bishop Ball abused 18 teenagers and young men between the years of 1977–19923. He had ascribed authority in his position as Bishop, and charismatic authority. His congregation continued to support him long after allegations of abuse were made and 200 letters of support were sent to police during their investigation due to his personal charisma and campaigns for his innocence.4. Bishop Ball's organisational celebrity enabled him to engage in organisational grooming and to evade penalties that would be expected by other clergy. He was given a police caution for one act of gross indecency in 1993 against a 16-year-old trainee monk and resigned, but was allowed to work in churches until 2010.5. In 2015, aged 83 years, he pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and one of misconduct in a public office and was sentenced to 32 months' imprisonment.
<p>Case #2 <i>Terence Banks</i> Carmi, E. (2014) <i>Case: CO1: case review</i>, Chichester; Diocese of Chichester (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Terence Banks was Head Steward of Chichester Cathedral.2. Mr. Banks pleaded guilty to 31 sexual offences and was convicted of a further offence. The offences were against 12 boys over a period of 29 years and included buggery, indecency with a child under 14 years and indecent assault. He met all but one of his victims through his Cathedral activities.3. He had an unpaid role at the Cathedral, which he took over from his father giving him ascribed, rather than actual, authority. This was added to by pupils at the Cathedral associated school seeing that their teachers were deferential to various individuals, including Mr. Banks. He had a lifelong association with the Cathedral having grown up living in the vicinity which led to a degree of local organisational celebrity. His high standing within the Cathedral community meant that some parents felt flattered by his friendship and thought he must be trustworthy. This "halo effect" is a process that has been described as "positional grooming" (National Crime Agency, 2013).4. The combination of ascribed authority and celebrity gave him the ability to repeatedly circumvent or break rules & evade consequences. Despite being banned from the school due to an allegation of abuse of a pupil and ongoing concerns about him being "attracted to boys" he was observed as being present on school premises. He was also able to take boys out to tea, buy them presents, meals and alcohol and take them to his home, where the majority of the abuse took place.5. Mr. Banks was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment in 2001. The report on his abuse between the 1970s and 2000 in the Church diocese and at the Cathedral was written in January 2004 but not published for another decade, following pressure from survivors.
<p>Case #3 <i>Barry Bennell</i> Goldstone, C. (2018) <i>R -v-Richard Jones (aka Barry Bennell) sentencing remarks of HHJ Goldstone QC, Liverpool Crown Court, 19 February</i> www.judiciary.uk/?s=bennell accessed August 29th 2018 (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Richard Jones (usually known as Barry Bennell) was a youth soccer coach who worked for at least four English professional soccer clubs during his career.2. He pleaded guilty or was convicted of 50 offences of sexual assault committed between 1979 and 1991 against 12 boys aged between eight and 14 years. The offences included buggery, attempted buggery and indecent assault.3. Mr. Bennell was an "organisational celebrity", with a national reputation in his professional arena. Due to this status the soccer clubs he was associated with were reluctant to act on information about inappropriate behaviour which at least suggested the possibility of sexual abuse.4. His reputation and value to the clubs he was involved with appears to have been a factor in the failure to act on concerns, breaches of boundaries and an allegation of abuse.5. In 2017 Mr. Bennell was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.
<p>Case #4 <i>Myles Bradbury</i> Scott-Moncrieff, L. & Morris, B. (2015)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Dr. Myles Bradbury was a consultant paediatric haematologist at Addenbrookes' Hospital, Cambridge, UK.

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Data source	Brief outline of issues in the case
<i>Independent investigation into governance arrangements in the paediatric haematology and oncology service at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust following the Myles Bradbury case</i> , Cambridge, Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (UK)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. He pleaded guilty to 28 offences against children, committed over some 3.5 years against 18 male patients between 10 and 15 years during medical examinations. As well as sexual assaults, the offences included voyeurism by secretly filming patients with a camera concealed in a pen during medical examinations and two were offences of possession of 16,000 indecent images of similar age to the patients he abused. 3. Hierarchical power as a senior medical practitioner was the basis of Dr. Bradbury's ability to circumvent agreed policies and safeguarding rules. 4. He justified not adhering to usual practice and rules by suggesting his "adjustments" to schedules and protocols were in his patient's best interests e.g. non-chaperoned appointments to spare boys' embarrassment. 5. Dr. Bradbury was sentenced to 22 years imprisonment in 2015, reduced to 16 years on appeal in 2016.
Case #5 <i>Frederick Lyman</i> Kestenbaum, N., (2017) <i>Report to the Board of Trustees of Choate Rosemary Hall</i> , New York, Covington & Burling LLP (USA)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Frederic Lyman was an English teacher, house advisor, and coach at an elite private New England boarding school in Massachusetts (US), Choate Rosemary Hall. 2. Mr. Lyman molested two 16-year-old students during the year that he worked at Choate. He engaged in sexual intercourse with the two students at his apartment on campus, in his car after taking the girls out to dinner and drinks and on ski trips with him. He also infected both girls with herpes which was known to the school clinic but covered up. 3. Mr. Lyman's hierarchical power came from his positions at the school as a teacher, coach, and house advisor. 4. Mr. Lyman's positions afforded him extensive control over his House and the students who lived in it. This position and his status as a teacher and a sports coach gave him a great deal of latitude to also take students off campus and travel with them on breaks (e.g. skiing trips). His behaviour was not questioned by other staff and he received little supervision. 5. Complaints by a parent who found out about Mr. Lyman's sexual relationship with his daughter, as well as her herpes, led to him being asked to resign by the school's administration. However, Mr. Lyman was able to arrange not to be reported to statutory authorities, and obtained a positive job reference from the school administration. This enabled him to get another teaching job and to continue his abusive relationship with one of the girls after leaving the school. Choate was one of three schools at which Mr. Lyman is believed to have abused students.
Case #6 <i>Kostka Chute</i> Royal Commission Investigation into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Case Study (2015) <i>Report of Case Study No. 13: The response of the Marist Brothers to allegations of child sexual abuse against Brothers Kostka Chute and Gregory Sutton Chute and Sutton</i> . Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney (Australia)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brother Kostka Chute was a member of the Marist Brothers religious order. He was appointed by the Order to at least 12 Catholic schools in Australia between 1952 and 1993. 2. He abused six students between the 1985 and 1989 at a number of different Marist Brothers primary schools, high schools, and colleges in Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory ACT. 3. Brother Kostka had hierarchical authority in that he was a teacher and then a Principal at a variety of schools. His position as Principal in particular gave him authority with little direct oversight and supervision, which greatly facilitated his sexually abusive behaviour. 4. He was reported for his sexually abusive behaviour of children on multiple occasions. He took advantage of his position to admit the abuse and to promise not to repeat the behaviour, which led to primarily minor verbal warnings and helped avoid reports to the authorities. He was also known to use his position to foster fear among his victims to discourage reporting (e.g. beating a child for "telling lies about him" after they accused him of sexually abusive behaviour). He was able to abuse children for nearly 30 years without legal consequences. 5. Brother Kostka pleaded guilty in 2008 to 19 child sex offences against six of his former students during the period 1985–1989. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a further 12 months of weekend detention, following his conviction. In 2019 he was found unfit to plead to 16 further allegations. The Judge in the case said that he accepted beyond a reasonable doubt that 14 of these had occurred.
Case #7 <i>Grant Davies</i> Royal Commission Investigation into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (2017), <i>Report of Case Study No. 37: The</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grant Davies was co-owner (with his sister) and principal instructor of a nationally known dance studio in Sydney, Australia. 2. In 2015 he pleaded guilty to 28 charges relating to child sex offences over a period of 13 years against adolescent female dance students. 3. Mr. Davies had both hierarchical power as co-owner and principal dance instructor and was an organisational and national dance community celebrity

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Data source	Brief outline of issues in the case
<p><i>response of the Australian Institute of Music and RG Dance to allegations of child sexual abuse, Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney (Australia)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. He used his positional and ascribed authority to enable him to make rules that enabled his abusive behaviour. This included giving private tutoring in a secluded location and to be generally regarded as “above suspicion”, despite concerns about his behaviour. 5. In 2016 Mr. Davies was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment, to serve 18 years before being considered for parole.
<p>Case #8 Earl Bradley Ammons, L. (2010). <i>Final report: Submitted to the Honorable Jack Markell, Governor, State of Delaware: Independent review of the Earl Brian Bradley Case.</i> Widener University Delaware Law School. (USA)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dr. Earl Bradley was a US Paediatrician practicing between 1994 and 2009. Over the course of his career he was in private practice in Pennsylvania and Delaware and was employed by Beebe Hospital and Bayside Medical Group, also in Delaware. 2. Dr. Bradley was first accused by a parent of improperly touching her child in 1994 while in private practice in Pennsylvania. Sexual abuse allegations were also made against him: in 1996 while a staff physician at Beebe Hospital; as part of Bayside Medical group in 2000: and in private medical practice in 2005 and 2008 in Delaware. 3. His power came from hierarchical and positional authority as a physician and as Chief of Pediatrics at Beebe Hospital. 4. Dr. Bradley used his position and power to conduct hundreds of unnecessary catheterisations and vaginal examinations on young children. He used his position and his reputation to convince his employers, the police, and State medical boards not to pursue allegations against him. 5. In 2010 he was indicted on 529 charges of raping, molesting, and exploiting 127 children. It is estimated that he may have actually sexually abused more than 1,200 children. He was sentenced to 14 consecutive life sentences plus 165 years imprisonment for his offences.
<p>Case #9 Jimmy Savile – BBC Smith, J. (2016) <i>The Independent Review into the BBC’s Culture and Practices during the Jimmy Savile and Stuart Hall Years</i>, London, BBC (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sir Jimmy Savile, OBE was a nationally known celebrity & entertainment icon. At the BBC he was a disc jockey and TV & radio presenter over a period of some forty years. His reputation was also enhanced by his charitable work through high profile fundraising. 2. In relation to the BBC, Jimmy Savile is believed to have committed sexual crimes against 72 male and female victims, 34 of whom were under 16 years old (including eight who were raped) over four decades. 3. Mr. Savile was a national celebrity and a public figure, often seen in the media in the company of other high-profile figures, including HRH Prince Charles. 4. His celebrity status enabled him to offend with apparent impunity – one witness described to the inquiry that managers viewed the “talent as more valuable than the (BBC) values”. Another said that when a junior employee complained to her supervisor in the late 1980s that she had been sexually assaulted by Savile she was told “keep your mouth shut, he is a VIP”. 5. Jimmy Savile died in 2011 at the age of 84 years. At that time allegations began to emerge about his offending. The subsequent inquiries revealed that there had been five allegations reported to the police made against him during his life and he had been formally interviewed by Surrey Police in 2009 relating to a girl’s residential school with which he had been associated. He was never charged with any offence.
<p>Case #10 John Rolleston Royal Commission Investigation into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (2017), <i>Report of Case Study No. 27: The response of health care service providers and regulators in New South Wales and Victoria to allegations of child sexual abuse</i>, Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney (Australia)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dr. John Rolleston was a general practice physician in 2 private medical practices in New South Wales and for a period was a Medical Director at Royal North Shore Hospital, a major public teaching hospital in Sydney, Australia. 2. Between 1969 and 1982 he abused sixteen male patients from young adolescents through young adults while claiming that his actions were medical procedures (primarily masturbating them). 3. A combination of hierarchical and charismatic authority contributed to Dr. Rolleston’s ability to repeatedly circumvent or break rules & evade consequences. 4. From 1992 onward, multiple sexual abuse allegations were made, including to the Health Care Regulators. Despite having previous convictions for professional related offences of dishonesty, no investigation of the allegations of abuse were undertaken. This was apparently due to his status and presentation of himself – the medical tribunal at the time commented that “no doubt that there was moral turpitude involved” in his dishonest behaviour. However, they went on ... “there is no dispute that he is a competent and caring medical practitioner” and allowed him to continue his medical career.

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Data source	Brief outline of issues in the case
<p>Case #11 <i>Jimmy A Williams</i> Bailey, M. (April 4, 2018). #MeToo: The story of a trainer, a trophy and an all-too-common betrayal. <i>The Chronicle of the Horse</i>. Retrieved August 14, 2018. (USA)</p>	<p>5. Between 2009 and 2012, Dr Rolleston was charged with criminal offences of indecent assault, occurring between 1969 and 1982. He was convicted of 21 offences and admitted 12 others. He was sentenced in 2011 and 2012 to four years imprisonment, to serve an aggregate minimum of 21 months before being eligible for parole. On conviction in 2011 he served a minimum 18-month jail sentence for 17 counts of indecent assault.</p> <p>1. Jimmy Williams was a talented horseman, inducted into multiple horse show Halls of Fame, won countless other honours, and the American Horse Shows Association named their Lifetime Achievement Award after him. He trained many young women to ride, some of whom went to win Olympic medals.</p> <p>2. Mr. Williams molested young women he was training from the age of 11 through early adulthood, some for many years. The abuse included sexual penetration or forcing them to perform oral sex on him.</p> <p>3. Mr. Williams' power came from his national celebrity. He was described as a "genius" who created Olympic medallists and performed magic with horses.</p> <p>4. Mr. Williams knew that his celebrity allowed him to engage in sexually abusive behaviour with impunity. Despite his abusive behaviour being observed by members of the equestrian club, victims reporting to their parents and some parents complaining to the equestrian club, he was never reported to the authorities or charged with a crime. He was apparently too important as a Coach to trainees, parents, other adults, and his equestrian club to be held accountable for his abusive behaviour.</p> <p>5. It was only after his death that reports of abuse were made publicly by women whom he had abused as adolescents. As a consequence, his membership of the United States Equestrian Federation was revoked, 24 years, 6 months and 14 days after his death.</p>
<p>Case #12 <i>Dr. Larry Nassar</i> McPhee, J. and Dowden, J. (2018) <i>Report of the Independent Investigation: The Constellation of Factors Underlying Larry Nassar's Abuse of Athletes</i>, New York, Ropes & Gray (USA)</p>	<p>1. Dr. Larry Nassar was the team physician and national medical co-ordinator for the USA Gymnastics national team for 20 years. He was also a physician at the School of osteopathic medicine at Michigan State University, where he treated the School's gymnasts and other athletes and the team physician to Holt High School, Michigan.</p> <p>2. In 2017 and 2018 he was convicted of 10 charges of sexual offences against female adolescent patients and of possessing 37,000 child abuse images as well as a video of him molesting underage patients. Subsequently, a financial settlement was reached in relation to 332 victims of his sexually abusive behaviour and it is estimated that overall Dr. Nassar committed thousands of acts of abusive behaviour with over 400 adult and minor victims.</p> <p>3. Dr. Nassar's power was derived from his hierarchical and positional authority as the National Medical Coordinator for US Gymnastics, the most senior physician in the organisation and a Professor of Medicine at Michigan State University. His 20 year position with US Gymnastics created organisational celebrity as the foremost medical expert in the sport.</p> <p>4. Dr. Nassar used his position and power to justify a medical need for vaginal "manipulation" as routine part of his treatment regime, to justify seeing patients unchaperoned and persuading victims that their discomfort with his procedures were not justified. He used his position and his reputation to convince his patients, their parents and other physicians that these treatments were medically appropriate, even after complaints were made. During his trial it was concluded that they were in fact primarily for his sexual gratification. Dr. Nassar also used physical force, feigned friendship and concern, and the imposing nature of his national position and reputation to enable him to commit acts of abuse which were often physical painful for his victims, as well as to keep them from reporting.</p> <p>5. In three separate trials in federal and State courts during 2017 and 2018 Dr. Nassar was sentenced, cumulatively, to between 140 and 360 years in prison.</p>
<p>Case #13 <i>Jerry Sandusky</i> Freeh, L. Sporkin, S, & Sullivan, W. (2012) <i>Report</i></p>	<p>1. Jerry Sandusky was a football coach at Penn State University (PSU) and founder of the Second Mile Foundation, a non-profit organisation which served underprivileged and at-risk youth.</p>

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Data source	Brief outline of issues in the case
<p><i>of the Special Investigative Council Regarding the Actions of The Pennsylvania State University Related to Child Sexual Abuse Committed by Gerald A. Sandusky</i>, Washington DC; Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP (USA)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Mr. Sandusky abused 10 boys and young men between 1994 and 2008. 3. He was treated as a local celebrity on the PSU campus, was revered as a football coach and had a national reputation. This led to a high degree of trust in him as a person, another example of the “halo effect” referred to above. He used his charismatic persona to groom families of young, at risk boys, enabling his abuse of them. 4. Mr. Sandusky used his status and personal reputation to receive privileges not accorded to others, such as keys to allow access to private school buildings. He also used his standing to intimidate any witnesses to his abuse into not reporting. The inquiry also found instances of university leadership being aware of his abuse and not acting, partly due to his position in the University community. 5. In 2012 Mr. Sandusky was convicted, after a fiercely contested trial, of 45 counts of sexual offences. He was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment, of which he must at least 30 years until being eligible for parole, by which time he would be 98 years old.
<p>Case #14 <i>Stuart Hall</i> Smith, J. (2016) <i>The Independent Review into the BBC’s Culture and Practices during the Jimmy Savile and Stuart Hall Years</i>, London, BBC (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stuart Hall was a UK radio and television personality. He appeared on more than 90 BBC radio and 100 BBC TV programs from the early 1960s through 1999 and was active on behalf a range of charities. 2. Hall kissed, fondled and had sexual intercourse with girls between the ages of 10 and 17 years of age in his BBC dressing room, while in his car, and at his home. 3. Mr. Hall’s power came from his national and organisational celebrity. 4. Mr. Hall offended with impunity, aware that victims and their families would be intimidated by his status and celebrity. In some cases, when they told their parents, the decision was made not to report because they felt that Mr. Hall was a “star” and that the allegations of abuse would not be believed. 5. Mr. Hall pleaded guilty to 14 offences of indecent assault committed between 1967 and 1986 against children between the ages of 10 and 17.
<p>Case #15 <i>Jimmy Savile – Leeds Teaching Hospitals</i> Proctor, S., Galloway, R., Chaloner, R., Jones, C. & Thompson, D. (2014) <i>The report of the investigation into matters relating to Savile at Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, Leeds</i>; Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sir Jimmy Savile was a nationally known celebrity in the UK. His involvement at Leeds hospitals spanned from 1960 through the 1990s. He volunteered there as a porter and used his celebrity status to take on a role as a fund raiser. 2. As part of the investigation 64 people came forward to share accounts of abuse and inappropriate sexual behaviour. His victims ranged in age from five to 75 years old, and included patients and staff. 3. Mr. Savile used his personal charisma, national and local celebrity to exploit a setting where he had considerable formal and informal power and influence. His flamboyant and “larger than life” persona gave him further licence for eccentric and unconventional behaviour which resulted in him being free to take opportunities to abuse e.g. he was well known for greeting women by kissing their hand, and sometimes licking their arm. 4. Savile regularly abused, without fear of any consequence, sometimes in the presence of other patients and staff members. He was widely known to junior staff as a “sex pest”, but his status prevented staff from reporting or intervening in relation to his inappropriate behaviour. 5. Savile was never charged or convicted during his lifetime. He died in 2011 aged 84 years at which time allegations began to emerge about his offending.
<p>Case #16 <i>Jimmy Savile – Stoke Mandeville Hospital</i> Johnstone, A & Dent, C. (2015) <i>Investigation into the Association of Jimmy Savile with Stoke Mandeville Hospital: A Report for Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust, Amersham</i>; Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sir Jimmy Savile was a nationally known celebrity in the UK. At Stoke Mandeville he was involved between 1968 and 1992. He volunteered as a porter and used his celebrity status to take on a role as a major fund raiser for the hospital, resulting in a newly built unit for which he raised funds being named after him. 2. He is believed to have committed sexual crimes at Stoke Mandeville against 65 female and one male victim, aged between 8 and 40 years, patients, visitors and staff. 3. Mr. Savile used his personal charisma and celebrity to exploit a situation where he had considerable formal and informal power and influence. It was widely known that he was admired by then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher who financially and politically supported his fundraising for Stoke Mandeville

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Data source	Brief outline of issues in the case
<p>Vize, C. and Klinck, B. (2015) <i>Legacy Report – Further Investigation into the Association of Jimmy Savile with Stoke Mandeville Hospital</i> Amersham; Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">4. His flamboyant and “larger than life” persona gave him further licence for “eccentric behaviour” which resulted in him being free to find opportunities to abuse. A local newspaper described him as the “patron saint of Stoke Mandeville Hospital.”5. Mr. Savile regularly abused, without fear of any consequence, sometimes in the presence of other patients and staff members. He was widely known to junior staff as a “sex pest”, but his status prevented staff from reporting or intervening in relation to his inappropriate behaviour.6. He was never charged or convicted during his lifetime. He died in 2011 aged 84 years at which time allegations began to emerge about his offending.
<p>Case #17 William Vahey Wonnacott, J. & Carmi, E (2016) <i>Serious Case Review: Southbank International School, Hammersmith & Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster LSCB</i> (UK)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. William Vahey, was a popular and respected teacher at Southbank International School, Westminster, London, UK.2. Mr. Vahey is believed to have abused in excess of 54 male adolescent pupils at Southbank International School between 2009 and 2013.3. An organisational celebrity, Mr. Vahey is an example of the use of self-created or charismatic authority. He came to Southbank having had a 40 year career in nine international schools around the world. Whilst at Southbank he established himself as having an “informal, unconventional teaching style” and was voted the second most popular teacher in the school. Residential trips with the school travel club he developed, and which he exploited to give opportunities for abuse, were extremely popular.4. Mr. Vahey used a combination of “personal charisma” and “difficult to manage” behaviour to enable him to ignore expected standards & behaviours, leading to him being able to abuse and “hide in plain sight”. Thus, having drugged pupils whilst on trips, he insisted on caring for them alone in his accommodation, giving him the opportunity to abuse them without their knowledge.5. Mr. Vahey killed himself before a planned arrest by the FBI could be executed.

Procedure: quantitative content analysis approach to identify powerful offenders' modus operandi

A Quantitative Content Analysis methodology was used to organise the powerful perpetrators' modus operandi. Content analysis represents a group of procedures which enable "... systematic, replicable analysis of text" (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015, p. 1). The hallmark of the Quantitative Content Analysis is the organising of qualitative data (i.e. in this case offenders' modus operandi behaviours) into a categorical coding scheme (Rose et al., 2015). For the present study a coding scheme was developed based on Kaufman's Modus Operandi Questionnaire (Kaufman, 2004: see below for details). The Quantitative Content Analysis approach has been used in a variety of studies related to sexual offending (e.g. Galeste, Fradella, & Vogel, 2012 and Mejia, Cheyne, & Dorfman, 2012). A qualitative methodology was selected for use in this study for a number of reasons including: the lack of available quantitative data describing powerful perpetrators of organisational child sexual abuse, immediate challenges to directly collecting data from this subgroup of offenders, and the high quality nature of available international inquiries and case studies describing these perpetrators. Moreover, Mays and Pope (1995) describe qualitative approaches as helping to develop concepts that enhance our understanding of complex social phenomena in natural settings. Patton (2002) discusses the value of this approach to describe subgroups in detail and in particular their behaviour and their experiences in context. As such, a qualitative methodology is consistent with this study's goal to help identify a critical, but overlooked, subgroup of child sexual abuse offenders with significant implication for prevention.

Identifying powerful offenders' modus operandi

As stated, a modus operandi coding system was developed based on Kaufman's Modus Operandi Questionnaire (MOQ; Kaufman, 2004) to identify the strategies employed by offenders in the 17 cases to perpetrate child sexual abuse in YSOs. The MOQ was originally designed to be a measure that assesses the full spectrum of MO behaviours to be able to accommodate the broad heterogeneity of child sexual offenders' pattern of perpetration. MOQ development involved both a comprehensive review of the literature and input from experts in the areas of law enforcement, offender treatment, victim/survivor treatment, advocacy, as well as obtaining input from child sexual offenders themselves. An exploratory factor analysis also helped clarify item inclusion for the 11 major grooming strategies (Kaufman et al., 1998).

The MOQ has been used to investigate child sexual offenders' modus operandi in a number of studies (Kaufman et al., 1998; Kaufman, Hilliker, & Daleiden, 1996; Leclerc, Proulx, & Beaugregard, 2009; Wortley & Smallbone, 2006). The goal here was to develop a coding manual that would reflect the full range of possible modus operandi strategies used by the 15 "powerful perpetrator" offenders under consideration.

The term "grooming" is used here to describe

A process by which a person prepares a child, significant adults, and the environment for the abuse of this child. Specific goals include gaining access to the child, gaining the child's compliance and maintaining the child's secrecy to avoid disclosure. (Craven, Brown, & Gilchrist, 2006, p. 297)

Eleven major grooming categories were identified from the MOQ (Kaufman et al., 1998) along a continuum from accessing and luring child and adolescent victims through keeping them silent following onset of the abuse (see Table 3 for the 11 major grooming strategies included for coding, their definitions, and their source). For each major grooming category, specific items from the MOQ were added to provide a full range of modus operandi strategies associated with each of the 11 major modus operandi areas.

Each of the authors reviewed the materials for either five or six of the 17 cases that met the study's powerful perpetrator criteria to identify the specific modus operandi strategies employed by offenders in each of their cases. To capitalise on their familiarity with the material, authors were

Table 3. Modus operandi coding categories and definitions.

Modus operandi categories ^a	Definition	Source
Grooming organisations and / or organisational staff	Strategies used by a perpetrator of child sexual abuse to gain the trust of an organisation and its members so that the perpetrator will have an easier time abusing victims within the organisation. An example of this is using a position of power in an organisation to gain the trust of staff. Sample Item: <i>Using an external position of power, status or celebrity to gain organisation staff's trust</i>	Lampard, K. and Marsden, E. (2015). Themes and lessons learnt from NHS investigations into matters relating to Jimmy Savile: Independent report for the Secretary of State for Health. London: Department of Health (UK)
Grooming parents or guardians	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse to gain the trust of the parents or guardians of potential victims to more easily facilitate the abuse of their child. An example of this is doing favours for family members Sample Item: <i>Giving a child special treatment at the organisation to gain a family's trust</i>	Irenyi, M., Bromfield, L., Beyer, L. and Higgins, D. (2006). Child maltreatment in organisations: Risk factors and strategies for prevention. National Child Protection Clearinghouse Issues, 25. Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies
Accessing victims	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse to gain access to potential victims for abuse. Examples of this include volunteering for a youth serving organisation and chaperoning field trips for children. Sample Item: <i>Created a position or organisation to access victims</i>	Kaufman, K. L., Holmberg, J. K., Orts, K. A., McCrady, F. E., Rotzien, A. L., Daleiden, E. L., and Hilliker, D. R. (1998). Factors influencing sexual offenders' modus operandi: An examination of victim-offender relatedness and age. <i>Child Maltreatment</i> , 3(4), 349–361.
Grooming victims	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse for gaining a victim's trust prior to abuse. Examples of this involve befriending the child, confiding in the child, or offering the child gifts or privileges. Sample Item: <i>Spending time with child to gain trust</i>	Kaufman, K. L., Hilliker, D. R., and Daleiden, E. L. (1996). Subgroup differences in the modus operandi of adolescent sexual offenders. <i>Child Maltreatment</i> , 1(1), 17–24.
Luring victims	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse to tempt a victim to go somewhere with them by offering a reward. Examples include promising a reward, or tricking a child into going somewhere. Sample Item: <i>Manipulating or tricking a victim into get them to go somewhere</i>	Tews, H. L., Zatkun, J. Kaufman, K.L. (2013). <i>The Effects of Offender Age and Offender-Victim Relationship on Modus Operandi Strategies to Lure the Victim</i> , Poster Presentation at the Annual Research and Practice Conference of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA), Chicago, Illinois.
Getting the child alone for the purpose of abusing them	Efforts made by perpetrators of child sexual abuse to get a child alone to facilitate abuse. Examples of this include sneaking into a child's room at night and taking a child to an isolated part of a building. Sample Item: <i>Taking a child to an isolated part of the organisation's building</i>	Kaufman, K. L., Hilliker, D. R., Lathrop, P., Daleiden, E. R., and Rudy, L. (1996). Sexual offenders' modus operandi: a comparison of structured interview and questionnaire approaches. <i>Journal of Interpersonal Violence</i> , 11, 19–34. doi:10.1177/088626096011001002
Efforts to minimise detection	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse to avoid being caught for their behaviour. Examples include testing victims to make sure they will keep quiet and denying abusive behaviour when questioned. Sample Item: <i>Abusing a victim in an isolate room or location.</i>	Kaufman, K. and Patterson, L. (2010). Using sex offenders' modus operandi to plan more effective prevention programs. In K. Kaufman (ed), <i>The prevention of sexual violence: A practitioner's sourcebook</i> . Hoyoake, MA: NEARI Press (1,3e)
Bribes and Enticements to gain cooperation in abusive acts	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse that involve offering the victim a tangible benefit, special privilege, or normalising sexual behaviour. Examples of this tactic include buying a victim clothes, taking the victim on a trip, showing a victim porn, or touching a victim in a non-sexual manner. Sample Item: <i>Promising drugs and/or alcohol</i>	Kaufman, K. L., Holmberg, J. K., Orts, K. A., McCrady, F. E., Rotzien, A. L., Daleiden, E. L., and Hilliker, D. R. (1998). Factors influencing sexual offenders' modus operandi: An examination of victim-offender relatedness and age. <i>Child Maltreatment</i> , 3(4), 349–361.
Threats and coercion to gain cooperation in abusive acts	Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse that involve creating fear in a victim so that they comply with abuse. Examples include	Kaufman, K. L., Holmberg, J. K., Orts, K. A., McCrady, F. E., Rotzien, A. L., Daleiden, E. L., and Hilliker, D. R. (1998). Factors influencing sexual offenders' modus

(Continued)

Table 3. Continued.

Modus operandi categories ^a	Definition	Source
Bribes and enticements to maintain victim silence following abuse onset	<p>threatening a victim with a weapon, telling a victim you will hurt their pet if they do not comply, or making a victim feel helpless to refuse sexual activity.</p> <p>Sample Item: <i>Threatening to physically harm the child.</i></p> <p>Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse that involve offering the victim a tangible benefit or special privilege if they remain silent about their abuse. Examples include giving the child candy, or promising a special opportunity in exchange for silence.</p> <p>Sample Item: <i>Promising to spend more time with the child if they keep the abuse a secret.</i></p>	<p>operands: An examination of victim-offender relatedness and age. <i>Child Maltreatment</i>, 3(4), 349–361.</p> <p>Kaufman, K. L., Holmberg, J. K., Orts, K. A., McCrady, F. E., Rotzien, A. L., Daleiden, E. L., and Hilliker, D. R. (1998). Factors influencing sexual offenders' modus operandi: An examination of victim-offender relatedness and age. <i>Child Maltreatment</i>, 3(4), 349–361.</p>
Threats and coercion to maintain victim silence following abuse onset	<p>Strategies used by perpetrators of child sexual abuse that involve creating fear in a victim so that they do not tell other about the abuse. Examples include physically harming the child, or telling a victim that no one will help them if they tell.</p> <p>Sample Items: <i>Threatening to harm one of the victim's family members if they reveal the abuse.</i></p>	<p>Kaufman, K. L., Holmberg, J. K., Orts, K. A., McCrady, F. E., Rotzien, A. L., Daleiden, E. L., and Hilliker, D. R. (1998). Factors influencing sexual offenders' modus operandi: An examination of victim-offender relatedness and age. <i>Child Maltreatment</i>, 3(4), 349–361.</p>

^aCategories based on Modus Operandi Questionnaire (Kaufman, 2004).

assigned the cases for which they served as the first reviewer in the determination of whether cases met the study inclusion criteria. Each author reread the case materials and noted modus operandi strategies used by the offender. These strategies were recorded based on the codes in the modus operandi coding manual. The modus operandi strategies were then combined across all cases and used to create an initial summary table that included the 11 major modus operandi categories, the specific modus operandi strategies that were used by offenders in each of the 17 study cases, and a listing of which offenders employed which strategies.

The author who had initially reviewed each case was then asked to review the same cases for a second time to identify any missed modus operandi strategies. They were again asked to use the modus operandi coding manual, comprised of the 11 major modus operandi categories and the draft [Table 4](#) reflecting the modus operandi strategies used in each case. This strategy was particularly productive and identified an additional 24% of modus operandi strategies across cases. Finally, since every case had been reviewed initially by at least two of the authors (and many were known in detail by all three), a final check on the accuracy of the coding was accomplished through a joint meeting of the authors to resolve 19 differences identified in modus operandi coding. Prior to this meeting, the authors were asked to carefully review the summary table and the discrepancies to be discussed. At the meeting all coding disagreements were discussed among the authors until consensus was reached. In some instances, this involved referring to original case material to help resolve differences in understanding regarding offenders' modus operandi.

Results

This section describes the modus operandi of offenders for the 17 cases included in this investigation, offers a summary of findings and provides illustrative examples drawn from cases. Modus operandi details are provided in [Table 4](#), organised by the 11 major modus operandi categories with the specific items used to code offenders' modus operandi provided under the category title. The numbers to the right of each modus operandi strategy reflect the cases in which this strategy was used.

Three descriptive indices are provided for each of the major modus operandi categories: (1) The total number of cases using the various modus operandi strategies in a given major modus operandi category. This is a simple frequency count of the number of times the modus operandi strategies within a major category were used across the 17 cases; (2) The number of different strategies used. This reflects the number of different modus operandi strategies used across the 17 cases for a particular major category; and (3) The number of cases that used at least one of the modus operandi strategies in this category. Numbers in parentheses in this section denote the number of cases using this strategy, while "Case #" refers to the corresponding case in [Table 2](#).

Threats and Coercion to Gain Cooperation in Abusive Acts and Grooming Victims represent the categories reflecting the largest number of modus operandi strategies used (39 for each). Threats and Coercion strategies were used in 13 of the 17 cases. It is also notable that a higher number of unique modus operandi strategies (10) were used in this category to accomplish the offender's abusive intent than for any other modus operandi category in this study. Examples in this category include Jimmy Savile forcing himself sexually on children he met at the BBC (Case #9) and Jimmy Williams threatening to stop his adolescent equestrian students' training if they didn't cooperate in sexually abusive acts (Case #11).

For Grooming Victims, all 17 cases included the use of at least one of this category's modus operandi strategies and six different strategies were used overall. In the largest number of cases offenders provided special attention to victims or tried to make them feel special to gain their trust (11). Next most frequent was the use of desensitisation strategies to make victims more vulnerable. Terence Banks, who served as the Steward of the Chichester Cathedral frequently groomed potential child victims in the choir by providing them with gifts, special attention, and in some instances overpaying them for small jobs (Case #2). Frederick Lyman groomed his adolescent students with trips off

Table 4. Powerful perpetrators' modus operandi strategies.

Modus operandi category/Modus operandi strategy	Which cases employed this strategy? (total # of cases)
<i>Threats & coercion to gain cooperation in abusive acts</i> (39 total strategies used; 10 different strategies; used at least once in 13 of 17 cases)	
Physically forcing the child to cooperate in the sexually abusive acts	2, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
The victim feared loss of the relationship and associated benefits, even if not stated	1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16
Making the child feel powerless to stop them	6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16
Making the child feel threatened non-verbally	6, 11, 12, 13, 16
Exposing to a victim	1,6,13
Threatening to get the child in trouble	9,14
Threatening to cut off special treatment and/or privileges	6
Threatening to physically harm one of the child's friends	7
Threatening to physically harm the child	13
Making the child feel threatened non-verbally	17
<i>Grooming victims</i> (39 total strategies used; 6 different strategies; used in 17 of 17 cases)	
Providing special attention and/or trying to make the child feel special to gain trust	1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16
Desensitisation to sexual contact (i.e. a progression from seemingly incidental touching [e.g. accidental touching of breast, buttocks or genitalia] to more purposeful and invasive sexual contact [e.g. fondling, oral sex, penetration])	1, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15
Desensitisation to sexual content (e.g. showing pornography, explicit TV)	6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17
Promising a tangible bribe (e.g. toys, candy, cigarettes)	3, 7, 8, 12, 14, 17
Befriending or acting like a friend to the child	2, 4, 12, 14, 16
Telling victims that abusive acts are a medical procedure	4, 8, 10, 12
<i>Grooming organisations &/or organisational staff</i> (38 total strategies used; 8 different strategies; used in 15 of 17 cases)	
Using an organisational position of power to gain staff's trust	1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15
Using an external position of power, status or celebrity to gain organisation staff's trust	2, 9, 12, 13, 17
Using their organisational position to create 1:1 situations with the victim	4, 5, 11, 12, 16
Manipulating the organisational system or rules (e.g. bypass screening, bypass rules or changing rules to reduce supervision)	4, 12, 13, 17
Other staff are concerned about behaviour, but do not report	6, 12, 14, 16
Members of the organisation made allegations of child sexual abuse "disappear" or was not reported	6, 11, 12, 15
Despite being reported for child sexual abuse within the organisation they were supported in future career efforts (e.g. job recommendations, continued hospital privileges)	6, 8, 10, 12,
Other staff provide the perpetrator with support despite suspicions and/or evidence	2, 6, 13
<i>Efforts to minimise detection</i> (34 total strategies used; 8 different strategies; used in 14 of 17 cases)	
Selecting an isolated location	6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15
Denied abusive behaviour when questioned about it	1, 7, 10, 12, 13
Covered up or rationalised aspects of their behaviour to minimise suspicion (e.g. hid clinic appointments, rationalised late night medical appointments as helping children avoid missing school)	1, 4, 10, 12, 13
Using anger, denial, intimidation, and/or power to reduce the chances that organisation staff will report, concerns	4, 7, 9, 13, 17
Keeping abusive behaviour minimal to avoid detection (e.g. disguising abuse as a medical exam or incorporating abuse into a medical exam)	4, 8, 12, 14
Giving victims alcohol and drugs to make them more cooperative or sedate them	5, 6, 8, 17
Made clear to others that his actions shouldn't be questioned (e.g. verbally or exerted their power) (G14)	4, 11, 14
When accused, he apologises and demonstrates contrition	6, 11
<i>Getting the child alone for the purpose of abusing them</i> (23 total strategies used; 5 different strategies; used in 13 of 17 cases)	
Taking a child to an isolated part of the organisation's building	1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15
Sneaking into the child's room or bed at night	1, 14, 15, 16, 17
Taking children on "informal outings" (e.g. for meeting goals, for good behaviour)	5, 13, 14, 16
Completing abuse while others are in the room but were blocked from seeing the abuse	4, 12, 15, 16
Taking a child from the organisation to your home	2, 14, 16
<i>Accessing victims</i> (23 total strategies used; 4 different strategies; used in 13 of 17 cases)	
Using an internal organisational position of power or status	1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17
Using a position of power, status or celebrity external to the organisation	1, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16

(Continued)

Table 4. Continued.

Modus operandi category/Modus operandi strategy	Which cases employed this strategy? (total # of cases)
Volunteering for an organisation	2, 5, 6, 15, 16
Targeting children who are cognitively or physically compromised (e.g. cognitively disabled, medically fragile, chronically ill, sedated for hospital procedure)	14,15,16
<i>Bribes & enticements to gain cooperation in abusive acts</i> (19 total strategies used; 7 different strategies; used in 8 of 17 cases)	
Providing an extra privilege, outing or opportunity (e.g. job, career opportunity, restaurant)	2, 6, 8,7,9
Providing a tangible bribe (e.g. toys, candy, gifts, cigarettes)	2,3,7, 8
Providing drugs and/or alcohol	2, 6, 9
Promising an extra privilege, outing or opportunity (e.g. job, career opportunity, restaurant)	1,13
Showing pornography to normalise sexually abusive behaviour	2,9
Promising an extra privilege, outing or opportunity (e.g. job, career opportunity, restaurant)	7,9
Providing a monetary bribe	1
<i>Grooming parents or guardians</i> (16 total strategies used; 2 different strategies; used in 13 of 17 cases)	
Establishing a relationship with a child's family	2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15
Using position of power or celebrity to gain the family's trust	2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15
<i>Threats & coercion to maintain victim silence following abuse onset</i> (16 total strategies used; 6 different strategies; used in 9 of 17 cases)	
Victims didn't report because they didn't think that they'd be believed	10, 11, 12, 13, 15
Telling the victim that this must remain a secret	1, 11, 16
Telling the victim that no one will believe them if they tell	11, 14
Physically harming the child	3, 8
Threatening to get the child in trouble	14
Threatening to physically harm the child	15
<i>Luring victims</i> (7 total strategies used; 2 different strategies; used in 5 of 17 cases)	
Providing an extra privilege, outing or opportunity (e.g. job, career opportunity, restaurant)	2, 9, 15, 16
Promising a tangible bribe (e.g. toys, candy, gifts, cigarettes)	9, 14, 16
<i>Bribes & enticements to maintain victim silence following abuse onset</i> (4 total strategies used; 3 different strategies; used in 5 of 17 cases)	
Telling the victim that this is our "special" secret and that they should not tell anyone	1, 11
Providing an extra privilege, outing or opportunity (e.g. job, career opportunity, restaurant)	13
Providing a monetary bribe	2

campus for dinner and alcoholic drinks (Case #5), while doctors Myles Bradbury (Case #4), Earl Bradley (Case #8), and Larry Nassar (Case #12) disguised their abusive acts as legitimate medical procedures.

Efforts to Groom Organisations and/or their staff constituted the third most frequent use of modus operandi strategies (38 strategies). In fifteen of the seventeen cases, offenders used at least one type of modus operandi strategy to groom their organisation and its staff, with eight different grooming strategies used in pursuit of this intent. The approaches most frequently adopted by offenders in these cases to gain the trust of an organisation's staff involved using power or celebrity with or external to the organisation or manipulating the organisations' rules. For example, Jimmy Savile used his TV celebrity and fund-raising success on behalf of hospitals to circumvent patient safeguarding rules (Cases #15 and 16). William Vahey used his position coordinating student educational trips to create one-to-one situations that allowed him to abuse students (Case #17). Despite being caught sexually abusing students, Frederick Lyman was able to negotiate a positive recommendation for his next position (Case #5).

In most cases offenders made use of modus operandi strategies intended to Minimise Detection of their abusive acts (14 cases), reflecting a total of 34 modus operandi strategies. Offenders frequently used denial when confronted, made attempts to actively covered up the abuse, and in some cases used alcohol and drugs to sedate victims and hide the abuse. William Vahey, for example, gave students on school trips drugs concealed in cookies to sedate them and in one instance drugged

another teacher to neutralise their supervision (Case #17). Larry Nassar (Case #12) visited athletes in their hotel room in order to be alone with them, and then abused them under the guise of performing medical procedures.

Modus operandi strategies intended to Get the Victim Alone were employed frequently by the powerful perpetrators in this sample (22 times). In many cases, offenders worked to get their victim(s) alone (13) as a precursor to child sexual abuse. In these cases, offenders used five different modus operandi strategies for this purpose. Most often, victims were taken to isolated parts of a building, on outings, or to the offender's home. For example, Jerry Sandusky, took low income youth on out-of-town trips to isolate them and rationalised the trips as part of his youth foundation's programming to provide underprivileged children with enrichment experiences (Case #13). Barry Bennell used his home for abusing his soccer trainee victims, knowing that they wouldn't be observed or interrupted (Case #3).

Offenders frequently used strategies involving the Grooming of Victims' Parents to gain their trust (16 strategies in total, represented in 13 of 17 cases). Interestingly, offenders in these cases exclusively used their power/celebrity or established a relationship with the family. For example, many families in Chichester were flattered by Terence Banks' attention, since he was associated with the church leadership and could also provide them with preferred Cathedral seating, which was highly prized (Case #2). In the case of Jimmy Williams, parents were enamoured with his prowess as one of the leading equestrian coaches in the country and someone who could potentially make their child an Olympian (Case #11).

Fifteen modus operandi strategies involved Using Threats and Coercion to Maintain Victim Silence following the onset of abuse (found in 9 different cases). Most often, victims believed that they wouldn't be believed or they were told by the offender that the abuse must remain their secret. For example, victims of Jimmy Savile (Cases #9,15,16), Stuart Hall (Case #14), Dr. Larry Nassar (Case #12) and Dr. John Rolleston (Case #10) all indicated that they didn't report at the time because they didn't think that they would be believed.

In just over half of the cases (8 of 17), Bribes and Enticements to Gain Cooperation in Abusive Acts were used with victims. The 19 modus operandi strategies reported included most often involved providing an extra privilege, outing, opportunity or tangible bribe. For example, Jimmy Savile (Case #9) and Stuart Hall (Case #14) promised victims "showbusiness" opportunities, and Jerry Sandusky gave his victims gifts and took them on expensive trips (Case #13).

Less frequently employed modus operandi categories were Luring victims (7 strategies used), Bribes and Enticements to Maintain Victim Silence Following Abuse Onset (4 strategies used), and Accessing Victims (4 strategies used). As with other categories, associated Modus Operandi strategies are presented in [Table 4](#).

Discussion

This section of the paper will discuss the selection of inquiries and cases for this study. Implications of modus operandi findings for the powerful perpetrator cases included in this study are also addressed. Recommendations for strengthening YSO policies and practice to address powerful perpetrators follows, as does a brief discussion of future research directions and study limitations.

Identifying powerful perpetrators of child sexual abuse in the organisational context

In keeping with study goals, this investigation employed rigorous criteria to identify prototypic powerful perpetrators who committed child sexual abuse against children and adolescents in a broad range of YSO contexts (see [Table 1](#)). The selection criteria applied reflected the need for reliable sources of case-based information that offered sufficient detail to describe the perpetrator's modus operandi. This requirement was balanced with a combination of hallmark characteristics that distinguish powerful perpetrators from other organisational offenders: (1) their authority within the

organisation; and (2) their use of this power to circumvent existing safeguarding rules and policies. This yielded a final sample of 17 cases reflecting 15 different child sexual abuse offenders (three cases pertained to Sir Jimmy Savile) from the UK, the US and Australia.

To begin examining the implications of child sexual abuse perpetration by powerful YSO offenders it was necessary to select cases describing high profile perpetrators. While it may be argued that these offenders are the exception rather than the rule, it is important to recognise that: (a) they largely comprise prolific offenders who have had a significant impact on both victims and YSOs; (b) their patterns of offending are instructive and have significant implications for the development of new prevention strategies, as well as, the strengthening of existing YSO prevention efforts; and (c) they are reflective of many other powerful offenders who have committed child sexual abuse in YSOs (i.e. we did not want to focus on highly unusual cases, the lessons from which might be less likely to generalise). Moreover, the study sample reflects child sexual abuse in a broad range of YSOs that include: the Church (Gibb, 2017); youth soccer (Goldstone, 2018); health care settings and hospitals (Johnstone & Dent, 2015; Proctor, Galloway, Chaloner, Jones, & Thompson, 2014; Scott-Moncrieff & Morris, 2015); elite sports (Bailey, 2018; Daniels, 2017); youth serving foundations (Freeh et al., 2012); and schools (Kestenbaum, 2017; Wonnacott & Carmi, 2016). Findings from this sample offer a critically important first look at the *modus operandi* of powerful perpetrators. Moreover, findings provide the type of risk-focused, public health-based foundation for future work in this area that has long been called for in this literature (Kaufman & Patterson, 2010; Reppucci & Haugaard, 1989).

Powerful perpetrators' modus operandi

This section discusses *modus operandi* findings related to the 15 powerful perpetrators included in this study (reflecting the 17 cases). The existing literature on powerful perpetrators, while quite limited in scope, is used whenever possible to contrast powerful perpetrators' *modus operandi* to that of other child sexual abuse offenders in the community and in organisational settings. *Modus operandi* categories that account for offenders' most frequent use of *modus operandi* strategies are highlighted in this discussion.

As noted in Table 3, violence related threats and coercion were one of the *modus operandi* strategies most frequently used by this study's powerful perpetrators. In fact, the most frequently employed strategy in this category was physically forcing the victim to participate in the abusive behaviour. A reliance on this type of strategy is in contrast to the *modus operandi* of both community-based child sexual abuse offenders and organisational child sexual abuse offenders in front-line YSO positions. Kaufman and his colleagues (Kaufman et al., 1998) found that community-based adult extra-familial child sexual abuse offenders used a combination of bribes/enticements and threats and coercion. However, their findings suggest a greater reliance on bribes and enticements (Kaufman et al., 1998), than threats and coercion. Similarly, Lanning and Dietz (2014) suggest that the majority of YSO perpetrators can be characterised as "nice guy" offenders, who are less likely to use coercion as part of their *modus operandi*. Sullivan and Beech (2004) also indicated that general YSO offenders were more likely to manipulate victims' emotions, rather than directly coercing their participation in sexual abuse. A similar emphasis on these manipulative behaviours was also reported by Moulden and her colleagues (Moulden et al., 2010), Parkinson and his colleagues (Parkinson et al., 2012) and Sullivan and Quayle (2012). It has been suggested that child sexual abuse offenders typically make a strategic decision to avoid threats and coercion in favour of bribes and enticements whenever possible, due to their concern that more coercive *modus operandi* approaches have a greater potential to result in victim disclosure (Kaufman & Patterson, 2010).

Powerful perpetrators' apparent lack of concern regarding the potential for coercion to lead to reporting may be explained by a closer examination of other high frequency *modus operandi* categories. In the case of both "Grooming Organisations and/or Organisational Staff" (the third most frequently endorsed *modus operandi* area – See Table 3) and "Efforts to Minimise Detection" (the fourth most frequently endorsed area), the "sway" of these offenders' authority and their ability to

manipulate rules, policies, and safety practices becomes apparent. For example, with regard to grooming the organisation, powerful perpetrators indicated that they used their position to facilitate their abusive intent (i.e. either their organisational or an external position) or they directly manipulated the YSO's systems or rules. Thus, in the case of Grant Davies and RG Dance (Case #7), for example, the Royal Commission was told that Mr. Davies insisted that he always gave his private lessons behind closed doors in a studio which had no viewing area for parents (Royal Commission, 2017). Their power was also reflected in the fact that even when staff became suspicious, they continued to support the powerful perpetrator, they failed to report their concerns, and in some cases actual allegations of child sexual abuse failed to be pursued, As Shakeshaft (2004) comments

Abuse is allowed to continue because even when children report abuse, they are not believed. Because of the power differential, the reputation difference between the educator and the child, or the mindset that children are untruthful, many reports by children are ignored or given minimal attention. (p. 41)

The modus operandi strategies associated with the minimising detection category further illustrates their power over the organisation and helps clarify how these perpetrators avoided prosecution. Frequent strategies employed ranged from completely denying abusive behaviour when confronted to telling other staff that their behaviours should not be questioned, as well as using anger, denial, and intimidation to minimise the chances that other staff would report their behaviour. While both community-based and other YSO child sexual abuse offenders groomed their organisation and sought to minimise detection, it was most typically carried-out in a very different fashion (Kaufman et al., 1998; Kaufman & Patterson, 2010; Wurtele, 2012). Many offenders who do not meet the "powerful perpetrator" criteria groomed their organisation to some degree in order to create the illusion that they were a good person, beyond reproach and sought to minimise detection to "fly under the radar" (Kaufman & Patterson, 2010; Kaufman et al., 1998; Sullivan & Quayle, 2012; Wurtele, 2012).

In stark contrast, powerful perpetrators in this study often use organisational grooming and efforts to minimise detection as opportunities to "flex their authoritative muscles", clarify that others are not in a position to challenge them, and to point out the potential consequences to staff of challenging them. The Serious Case Review relating to Southbank International School (Case #17) comments "Vahey therefore assumed and maintained his powerful position through establishing himself as a popular teacher with pupils and parents, whose position could, only with difficulty, be challenged by others in the school" (Wonnacott & Carmi, 2016, p. 22).

Finally, it is notable that Turner and his colleagues (Turner et al., 2014) noted that organisational offenders displayed less general antisocial and psychopathic behaviour than non-organisational child sexual abuse offenders. Perhaps powerful perpetrators use of more violent modus operandi, bullying of other organisational staff and less concern with minimising detection is due to the presence of greater antisocial behaviour and heightened psychopathy as compared to other organisational offenders. Future research should investigate potential differences in these domains between powerful perpetrators and other organisational offenders.

There are of course similarities in powerful perpetrators' modus operandi behaviour with other types of offenders, especially those that are implicit to "successfully" committing child sexual abuse against a child or adolescent victim. As with all other child sexual abuse offenders' attempts to fulfil their abusive intent, powerful perpetrators must also engage or lure their victims, gain access to and eventually isolate them, gain their cooperation in the abusive acts, and maintain their silence following the onset of abusive behaviours (Erooga et al., 2012; Kaufman & Patterson, 2010). These modus operandi behaviours are also reflected in the strategies of powerful perpetrators presented in Table 3. Yet, even here differences in how powerful perpetrators carry out these modus operandi behaviours diverge from other child sexual abuse offenders. For example, powerful perpetrators' use of grooming strategies is predominated by efforts to desensitise potential victims to sexual content and context (i.e. one-third of the grooming strategies used were in one of these two categories). Further, two-thirds of the strategies they used to accessing their victims were directly

tied to leveraging their position of power with the YSO, as was just under half of the strategies that they used to groom potential victims' parents or guardians.

Recommendations

Recent articles by Mathews (2017a) and Smallbone (2017) highlight critical factors necessary to translate the findings of the Australian Royal Commission into effective organisational prevention strategies. Some of these same recommendations have relevance for developing prevention directions to address powerful perpetrators in YSOs. For example, Mathews (2017b) identifies the need for YSO leaders themselves to "... understand the various permutations of sexual abuse, and how these may present themselves in their particular organisation". Further, Smallbone (2017) echoes this sentiment suggesting that "Effective prevention ... begins with a clear and valid concept of the problem – who is involved, and where, when, how and why it occurs" (p. 100).

This section reviews key directions for incorporating strategies to address powerful perpetrators into the YSO context. It will briefly discuss directions which include prevention education strategies, policy enhancement, and efforts to create a YSO organisational climate that prioritises youth safety. The paper concludes with study limitations and suggestions for research directions.

Educating YSOs to recognise and address risks posed by powerful perpetrators

A key theme from the cases reviewed was the failure of organisations to recognise behaviour which was indicative of possible abuse (for example the frequency of illness occurring on William Vahey's travel club trips necessitating care by him [Case #17]); Myles Bradbury not following accepted procedure (e.g. chaperone policy which he justified as being in patients' interests; Case #4); or in the most gross cases to have clear procedures with which to deal with abusive behaviour by powerful members (e.g. in the case of Sandusky [Case #13] and at least two of the Savile cases [Cases #9,16] abusive acts were reported but not acted upon). First and foremost, therefore, organisations need to recognise the potential for child sexual abuse committed by powerful individuals associated with their organisation (e.g. administrators, board members, donors, high status professionals, celebrities). This means that YSOs should develop child sexual abuse prevention education for all organisational staff, including leadership, board members and involved donors.

Training materials should provide a compelling case for addressing this previously neglected safety concern, clarify consequences of child sexual abuse by powerful perpetrators, highlight risk factors, and outline plans for implementing more comprehensive prevention strategies. Modus operandi strategies identified in this study that distinguish powerful perpetrators from other organisational offenders would provide an important foundation to help staff and volunteers recognise these unique patterns of perpetration. For example, training should address powerful perpetrators' frequent use of force to gain cooperation in sexually abusive acts as well as their efforts to directly use their position of power to circumvent safety rules and to intimidate staff who may consider reporting concerns. In developing these materials, YSOs should draw from the rich detail offered by child sexual abuse inquiries and case studies. This would be facilitated by our field developing ongoing resources that summarise and point to learning and recommendations from key inquiries and case studies.

Expanding organisational safety policies and practices

Findings from this investigation demonstrate the uneven application of safety policies and practices to powerful members of YSOs. Such a circumstance can create organisational vulnerabilities which increase the potential for child sexual abuse. For example, Sir Jimmy Saville's status, political connections and very public profile as a charitable fundraiser (Cases #15,16) allowed him to ignore existing safeguarding policies, engage in highly visible sexually inappropriate behaviours with minor patients and hospital staff, as well as have complaints of sexual abuse to administrators not proceeded with,

often it appears because the nature of the alleged behaviour was in such contrast to his public persona.

A careful reconsideration of existing organisational safety policies and safeguarding practices should begin with the recognition that current policies and practices are “downward facing”. That is, they are written from the perspective of the organisation’s leadership and directed down the organisational chart to address the behaviour of staff and volunteers. Ensuring the safety of youth served by the YSO will require expanding safety policies to also include “upward facing” safety strategies that focus on the organisation’s leadership, Board, donors, and any other powerful individuals or positions within each organisation.

This process should begin with a careful review of these downward facing safety policies, prevention strategies, daily practices, and safety training to ensure that they effectively minimise risks associated with potential child sexual abuse perpetrated by staff and volunteers. Next, organisations should seek to remedy the lack of policy and practice guidelines directed specifically toward their leadership (i.e. administrative staff, board, donors, celebrity champions).

In doing so YSOs should both consider and address broad-based risks that concern all organisational settings (e.g. basic safety policies that board members are not required to follow), but also risk factors specific to particular types of organisational settings (e.g. medical personnel circumventing parent chaperone policies for medical procedures). Incorporating a broad range of organisational stakeholders into this process (e.g. from line staff and volunteers to board members and donors) will foster the development of stronger and more comprehensive policies and practices. Policy elements to address the potential for powerful perpetrators could include: making all YSO volunteers, staff, leadership, board members, and involved donors mandatory reporters of child abuse and neglect; developing more detailed child abuse reporting procedures that require internal notification of both leadership and board; ensuring that policies protect staff and volunteers from more powerful organisational members and offer multiple means of securing consultation when safety concerns involving leadership arise; and requiring training about powerful perpetrators and how such concerns should be addressed.

Finally, future investigations should more systematically examine the value of offender modus operandi for identifying areas of organisational safeguarding policy failures. While this article has highlighted the ways in which powerful perpetrators can circumvent well-conceived safeguarding policies and practices, it also points to instances where offenders have exploited safeguarding failings. In some cases the particular modus operandi of offenders in this study are a direct reflection of organisational safeguarding failures.

For example, in the Sandusky case, the failure of YSO management and staff to fully understand and implement their own organisations’ safeguarding policies and practices is apparent, particularly telling, given that many of these policies and practices were formally required by their organisation. Specifically, at least one janitorial staff member at Penn State who actually saw Mr. Sandusky (Case #13) sexually assaulting a boy failed to report that behaviour out of fear of losing his job. Furthermore, Penn State football administrators failed to report this abuse in an effort to protect their programme (Freeh et al., 2012) and were subsequently prosecuted for child-endangerment in relation to this (TMJ, 2017). More generally this issue may be linked to a combination of the failure to fully understand the dynamics of child sexual abuse, the potential practical challenges of addressing colleagues crossing professional boundaries, and the organisational (and possibly reputational and financial) consequences of revealing the abusive behaviour.

Take steps to develop a strong, positive organisational safety culture

Organisations need to create a culture and climate that is conducive to staff, youth, and their parents reporting safety concerns as soon as they are noted. At the same time, it is equally important that the organisational structure is conducive to ensuring a fair assessment of facts and an effective response to all allegations of abuse, no matter if concerns are raised about members of the staff or leadership.

Inquiry and case reviews reflected a number of instances where initial reports were made but not pursued by youth serving organisations (e.g. Peter Ball [Case #1], Terence Banks [Case #2], Jerry Sandusky [Case #13]). In some cases, this will require the development of new policies, in others there will need to be greater emphasis on implementing policies and practices as written. Creating a more proactive safety culture should involve the provision of training, resources, and supervision that encourages early identification and reporting to address safety concerns. This should also include trainings that help staff utilise policies and consultation resources to address “policy drift” on the part of powerful staff and organisational leaders to ensure that it does not represent movement toward child sexual abuse.

Practical and ongoing behaviour on the part of leadership demonstrating their commitment to youth safety policies are also critical for shifting organisational climate. A number of studies emphasised the importance of organisational culture as much as policy and procedure (Lampard & Marsden, 2015). Palmer and Feldman (2017) suggest that, “... leaders of youth-serving organisations (should) ... purge their cultures of content that is conducive to child sexual abuse and instil in them content that is antithetical to abuse” (p. 31). They go on to say that organisational culture can be “... intentionally marshalled and even manufactured by powerful actors in support of their strategic objectives” (p. 31). Achieving such a goal should involve: leadership that establishes safety as a priority both through regular communication and strategic action; development of a comprehensive set of safeguarding policies and practices; the incorporation of effective prevention practices, regular leadership, staff, and volunteer training; strong supervision to ensure proper implementation of safeguarding policies and practices, as well as programme evaluation to identify strengths as well as areas in need of enhancement (Mathews, 2017a; Palmer & Feldman, 2017; Smallbone, 2017; Todahl, Davis, & Kaufman, 2010; Wurtele, 2012).

Study limitations

Inevitably there are limitations to this study which should be borne in mind when considering its findings. These limitations also inform some of the suggestions for future research outlined below.

This study was restricted to English language cases and as such may reflect findings that are not generalisable to YSOs in non-English speaking countries. Further, case reviews and inquiries are not undertaken for all organisational child sexual abuse and therefore may not be representative of the full range of powerful perpetrators in YSOs. Moreover, case reports, inquiries, and media based reports of child sexual abuse are not written for the purpose of identifying offenders *modus operandi*. As such, there may be some aspects of *modus operandi* that have not been included in source materials. Study criteria required that there was sufficient detail to complete the *modus operandi* analysis. As a result, some powerful perpetrator cases could not be included in this investigation.

This study focused exclusively on the *modus operandi* of powerful perpetrators. At the same time, however, there is a need to explore other important dimensions that may reflect differences, as well as, similarities to other child sexual offender groups. For example, currently the literature on offender’s motivation to be employed by youth serving organisations is mixed. Thus, whilst Sullivan and Beech (2002) and Leclerc, Feakes, and Cale (2015) found that many male offenders specifically entered the children’s workforce in order to access children to abuse, others did not find that to be the case to the same extent (Colton & Vanstone, 1996; Erooga et al., 2012). Future studies should explore this and other critical dimensions to better understand this under-studied offender group.

This study may have also been impacted by the exclusive inclusion of male child sexual abuse offenders. While there seems to be a clear preponderance of men in leadership positions and high rates of males perpetrating YSO child sexual abuse, these findings should not be construed as representative of abuse perpetrated by female offenders in YSO contexts (Darling, Hackett, & Kimberly, 2018; Erooga et al., 2012). Finally, a mixed methods approach was used, which relied on descriptive statistics to outline results. In future studies, a different methodology could be adopted that would

allow for the use of inferential statistical analyses which would add further rigor to this area of research.

Future research directions

Given the nascent nature of research on powerful perpetrators, a variety of directions should be pursued to grow this literature. Possible areas for further research into powerful child sexual abuse perpetrators in YSO settings include: epidemiological studies to determine incidence; investigations of modus operandi patterns based on offenders' involvement with different types of YSOs (e.g. sports, school) and their role in the organisation (e.g. organisation director, board member, donor); studies that examine how offending by powerful perpetrators differs based on culture (e.g. country, religious beliefs, community values) and perpetrator gender; and examine the efficacy of various "upward facing" prevention policies and practices specifically designed to address the potential of child sexual abuse in YSOs perpetrated by powerful individuals.

Consideration should also be given to methodologically-focused studies intended to enhance the investigation of this phenomenon. For example, future studies could include a more direct collection of information by accessing impacted YSOs to more fully understand the depth and breadth of powerful perpetrators' modus operandi. This area of investigation would also benefit from the application of more intensive mixed-method study methodologies that would offer the benefits of more fully collecting both qualitative and quantitative data as a foundation for prevention planning. Finally, consideration should be given to efforts designed to solicit input from organisational powerful perpetrators themselves. This could be accomplished by interviewing offenders who have been detected and incarcerated and/or through online solicitations of individuals who have not been detected but may be willing to anonymously share insights into their organisational offending and perceptions of how prevention may be improved in YSOs. While each approach has limitations, they are both likely to offer unique information that can help foster a better understanding of the problem, and perhaps more creative solutions to improve youth safety in the YSO context.

The intention of this investigation was to identify powerful perpetrators as a significant, but so far neglected offender population within youth serving organisations. The vast majority of these organisations have "powerful" members as part of its leadership, board, and donors, yet there has been little, if any, research or prevention programming to address this type of offender. This study provides an initial description of powerful perpetrators, offers a summary of their modus operandi described in 17 international case studies, and it identifies modus operandi behaviours that differentiate between powerful perpetrators and other child sexual offenders in youth serving organisations. This article also provides initial recommendations for enhancing organisational safety that is "upward focused" (i.e. designed to address powerful perpetrators) as a complement to existing prevention initiatives that are exclusively "downward focused" (i.e. solely directed toward organisational staff and volunteers). Identification of this important offender group is a significant first step, the challenge will be to both promote research to better understand how prevention should be designed to foil powerful perpetrators, as well as fostering prevention programming which includes a programme evaluation component to ensure a safer environment for the youth involved with youth serving organisations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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